









The current crisis has centered on borrower defaults on mortgages 
and the associated effects on banks’ own credit standing (and in several 
cases their own default), which in turn led to tightened conditions 
for lending to new (mortgage) borrowers. Any model that does not 
incorporate all or most of these key elements cannot possibly hope to 
capture the defining features of the current crisis. This is particularly 
true of standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, 
which (mostly) assume away the possibility of default altogether!
This paper builds on our previous model of a system in which 
default plays a central role for both borrowers and banks and in 
which financial intermediation and money thus have a necessary real 
function. Specifically, we include both an additional good, housing, 
in the prior composite basket of goods and services and an additional 
agent, a new entrant to the housing market. Our previous papers on 
this include Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2004, 2005, 2006). 
Dealing with a model with default and heterogeneous agents is 
not straightforward, which is why standard DSGE models abstract 
from such concerns despite their resulting lack of realistic micro-
foundations. We therefore regard this paper as a preliminary step in a 
longer exercise. In particular, the shocks that we model in the second 
period of our two-period model (the first being an initial predetermined 
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set-up period) can be categorized as supply shocks, in which the agents’ 
endowment declines greatly in the case of adverse shocks. Nevertheless, 
our model is general enough to allow for the examination of a wide 
variety of shocks that can lead to financial instability.
In practice, the main adverse shock in 2007–08 was a sharp decline 
in housing prices in the United States, whereas previously they had 
been expected to continue rising or, at worst, to hold steady. In a future 
version of this paper, we will experiment with this and other financial 
shocks. The main reason for proceeding with the current model is 
simply shortage of time. This kind of simulation model necessarily 
involves learning by doing, so we started with the shocks that we had 
used in our prior work. But Western economies were, in fact, facing 
adverse supply shocks in 2007–08, in the guise of rising energy and 
commodity prices, and these played a role in worsening the current 
downturn. Furthermore, our simulations include examples of changes 
in financial conditions, such as changes in the money stock (interest 
rates) and in bank capital endowments, so we can potentially explore 
how financial policy measures (including government recapitalization 
of banks) may affect the outcome. Nevertheless, this should be treated 
as a preliminary exercise.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 1, we briefly reprise 
the basic structure of the Goodhart-Sunirand-Tsomocos (GST) model 
and detail the innovations that we have made here. Section 2 sets 
out how the model works and its clearing conditions. In section 3, 
we report our choice of exogenous parameters for our numerical 
simulation and describe the resulting equilibrium values. In section 
4, we report on the comparative statics of changes in the parameters 
chosen, and section 5 concludes.
With such a large, and alas complicated, model, there are a vast 
number of exercises that could be run, each with an accompanying set 
of tables and diagrams. In one sense this is a strength of the approach, 
since it supports the examination of a huge variety of potential shocks 
and policy responses, both individually and in conjunction. At the same 
time, however, it can lead to a mind-boggling multiplication of detail. 
In pursuit of focus and comparative simplicity, we focus here on just 
four examples: a decrease in the money supply in the initial period; an 
increased desire to take on risk (as occurred in 2003–06), which leads 
to adverse shocks having a stronger effect on the system; a (foreseen) 
intervention by the authorities to provide liquidity assistance in very bad 
states; and a combination of the former two simultaneously, which allows 
us to examine the extent to which the resulting effects are nonlinear.217 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
1. The baCkgRounD seTup
Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2004, 2006) and Tsomocos 
(2003) develop models of financial stability that are rich enough to 
include defaultable consumer loan, deposit, and interbank markets. 
In the models, consumers maximize their expected utility from 
consumption of goods, and banks maximize their expected profits. 
The main financial imperfection in Goodhart, Sunirand, and 
Tsomocos (2004, 2006) is that they assume that individual bank 
borrowers are assigned, by history or by informational constraints, 
to borrow from a single bank. Money is introduced by a cash-in-
advance constraint, whereby a private agent needs money to buy 
commodities from other agents; commodities cannot be used to buy 
commodities. Similarly, they assume that agents needing money 
can always borrow cheaper from their (assigned) bank than from 
other agents; banks have an informational (and perhaps scale) 
advantage that gives them a role as an intermediary. The amount 
of loans they repay is a choice variable for consumers, so default 
in these models is endogenous.
The general model (Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos, 2006) 
features a set of heterogeneous private sector agents with initial 
endowments of both money and commodities; it is an endowment 
model without production. There is also a set of heterogeneous banks, 
who similarly have differing initial allocations of capital (in the form 
of government bonds). There are two other players, a central bank 
that can inject extra money into the system through open market 
operations (OMOs), and a financial supervisory agency, which can set 
minimum liquidity and capital requirements and imposes penalties 
on failures to meet such requirements and on defaults.
The main purpose of this paper is to model the market for 
mortgages and examine the implications of default in bank lending 
and of a housing market crisis. To do so, we alter the above framework 
in the following ways.
—First, we introduce another good into the economy, which is 
durable and gives utility in every period. The utility of consuming 
this good resembles the utility from buying a house. For tractability, 
the durable good (house) is assumed to be infinitely divisible.
—Second, we explicitly model a market for mortgages. Consumers 
enter a mortgage contract to buy housing, which they pledge as 
collateral. They default on their mortgage when the endogenous value 
of collateral is less than the amount they have to repay (Geanakoplos, 218 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis
2003; Geanakoplos and Zame, 1997). When they default, the bank 
seizes the amount of housing pledged as collateral and immediately 
offers it in the next period housing market. In this sense default is 
highly discontinuous, as consumers do not choose the exact amount 
they want to default (as in the model discussed above), but only 
decide on whether to default.1 
—Third, we introduce a new agent, λ, who is only born in period two. 
The motivation behind this is that the healthy functioning of the housing 
market generally depends on the existence of first-time buyers. 
—Fourth, we allow for short-term loan markets operating within 
each period. This was not necessary in the Goodhart, Sunirand, 
and Tsomocos models, but in our analysis it plays a crucial role in 
providing credit to first-time buyers, namely, Mr. λ. For consistency, 
all agents can borrow short-term. In this market, there is no 
uncertainty regarding repayment. The central bank intervenes in 
the short-term loan markets in the second period to keep the interest 
rates (in the good state) at reasonable levels. 
—Finally, since we are not considering wider asset markets, we 
exclude capital requirements for banks from our analysis.
2. The moDel 
Given the limited participation in the loan markets in our 
model, we need at least four agent-households (α, β, φ, λ) and two 
commercial banks (γ, δ). There are two periods and S states of the 
world. All agents maximize their utility over the consumption of 
the good and of housing in every period t ∈ T = (0, 1) and state s ∈ S. 
Banks maximize their expected profits in the second period. The set 
of all states is given by s ∈ S* = {0} ∪ S.
Agent h ∈ (α, β) is endowed with the good at every s ∈ S*, whereas 
agent λ is endowed at every s ∈ S, since he enters the economy only in 
the second period. Agent φ is endowed with houses only at t = 0. Agents 
α and φ interact with bank γ, while agents β and λ are associated 
with bank δ. All households are also given government cash free 
and clear of any obligations (ms*≥0). Both endowments and cash 
are allowed to vary across states of nature.
The central bank acts in the interbank market at t = 0 by 
providing liquidity MCB and in the short-term loan markets at t = 1 
1. Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) analyze 
continuous default.219 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
by providing liquidity M s
CB
γ  and M s
CB
δ  in the markets organized by 
banks γ and δ, respectively.
In the following subsections, we give the timeline of our model 
and specify the optimization problems for all the participants in 
the economy.
2.1 The Time Structure of Markets
In each period t ∈ T, six markets meet: the short-term (intraperiod) 
loan, mortgage, deposit, and interbank (intertemporal) markets meet 
simultaneously, and then the good and housing markets meet. Short-
term loans come due at the end of the period. This setup maximizes 
the number of transactions possible and allows agents to borrow in 
the short-term money market in order to invest in the long-term bond 
or asset market. It also allows for an explicit speculative motive for 
holding money. Agents have the option of investing cash in the short 
loan market and then carrying it over to the next period. The only 
reason they may not do this is that they believe they will get a higher 
return from holding deposits. This not only preserves Keynesian 
motives on the uses of money, but also provides a rationale for an 
upward-sloping term structure.
Figure 1 indicates our time line, including the moments at which 
the various loans and assets come due. We make the sequence precise 
when we formally describe the budget set.
Figure 1. Time Linea
Source: Authors’ drawing.
a. CB: central bank; B: commercial banks; H: households.220 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis
2.2 Household α’s and β’s Optimization Problem
Each consumer h ∈ {α, β} maximizes his payoff, which is his utility 
from consumption of the good and the house.2 In order to acquire 
housing he enters a mortgage contract, which he has to repay in the 
last period. The amount of housing that he purchases is pledged as 
collateral. He honors his mortgage when the value of the housing 
that he has bought is greater than the amount he has to repay. If it is 
lower, then he defaults on his mortgage and the bank that extended 
the mortgage seizes the collateral. In essence, he repays the minimum 
between the two values, that is, min(value of collateral, mortgage 
amount). We denote by S S
h
1 ⊂  the set of states that agent h does not 
default on his mortgage, that is, S
h
1 : value of collateral ≥ mortgage 
amount}. The maximization problem is as follows:
max
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(that is, the expenditure for housing at t = 0 ≤ amount borrowed 
short-term at t = 0 + mortgage amount + initial private monetary 
endowment);
µ0 01 01
h h p q ≤   (2)
(that is, short-term loan repayment ≤ good sales at t = 0);
b
r














(that is, expenditure for housing in the second period, state   
s S
h ∈ 1  + mortgage repayment ≤ amount borrowed short-term + 
private monetary endowment in s S
h ∈ 1 );
2. In our simulations, we use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 




h h p q s S ≤ ∀ ∈ 1 1 1 ,   (4)
(that is, short-term loan repayment ≤ good sales in s S
h ∈ 1 );
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(that is, expenditure for housing in the second period, state s S
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h h p q s S ≤ ∀ ∉ 1 1 1 ,   (6)
(that is, short-term loan repayment ≤ good sales in s S
h ∉ 1); and 




1 1 ≤ ∀ ∈ ,
*   (7)
(that is, quantity of goods sold in s ≤ endowment of goods in s);
where
k = γ for h = α and k = δ for h = β; 
bh
s2 ≡ amount of fiat money spent by h ∈ H to trade in the housing 
market in s ∈ S*; 
qh
s2 ≡ amount of goods offered for sale by h ∈ H in s ∈ S*;
µ
h ≡ mortgage amount that h ∈ H  takes out;
µh
s ≡ short-term borrowing by h ∈ H in s ∈ S*;
r
k ≡ mortgage rate offered by bank k;
rk
s ≡ short-term rate offered by bank k in s ∈ S*; 
ps1 ≡ price of the good in s ∈ S*;
ps2 ≡ price of housing in s ∈ S*;
eh
s1 ≡ endowment of goods of h ∈ H in s ∈ S*; and
mh
s ≡ monetary endowment of h ∈ H in s ∈ S*. 
2.3 Household φ’s Optimization Problem
Agent φ is endowed with housing at t = 0, some (much) of 
which he sells to buy goods for consumption. He then deposits 
interperiod a part of the sales receipts for use in the second period. 
His maximization problem is as follows:222 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis
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(that is, expenditure for goods + interperiod deposits ≤ amount 
borrowed short-term + private monetary endowment at t  =  0);
µ
φ φ
0 02 02 ≤ p q   (9)
(that is, short-term loan repayment ≤ housing sales at t = 0);
q e 02 02
φ φ ≤   (10)
(that is, quantity of housing sold at t = 0 ≤ endowment of housing 
at t = 0);
b
r
d r m s S s
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(11)
(that is, expenditure of goods ≤ amount borrowed short term + deposits 
and interest payment + private monetary endowment in s);
µ
φ φ
s s s p q s S ≤ ∀ ∈ 2 2   (12)
(that is, short-term loan repayment ≤ housing sales in s); and
q e q s S s2 02 02
φ φ φ ≤ - ∀ ∈   (13)
(that is, quantity of housing sold in s ≤ endowment of housing at   
t = 0 – quantity of housing sold t = 0);
where
bs1
φ ≡ amount of fiat money spent by φ to trade in the goods market 
in s ∈ S*;223 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
qs2
φ ≡ amount of housing offered for sale by φ in s ∈ S*;
d
φ ≡ deposit amount for φ;
µ
φ
s ≡ short-term borrowing by φ in s ∈ S*;
r d ≡ deposit rate;
rs
γ ≡ short-term rate offered by bank γ in s ∈ S*;
e02
φ ≡ endowment of housing of φ at t = 0; and
ms
φ ≡ monetary endowment of φ in s ∈ S*.
2.4 Household λ’s Optimization Problem
Agent λ enters the economy in the second period and is endowed 
with goods. His maximization problem is as follows: 
max
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(that is, expenditure for housing ≤ amount borrowed short-term + 
private monetary endowment in s);
µ
λ λ
s s s p q s S ≤ ∀ ∈ 1 1   (15)
(that is, short-term loan repayment ≤ good sales in s); and




1 1 ≤ ∀ ∈   (16)
(that is, quantity of goods sold in s ≤ endowment of goods in s);
where
bs2
λ ≡ amount of fiat money spent by λ to trade in the housing market 
in s ∈ S; 
qs1
λ ≡ amount of goods offered for sale by λ in s ∈ S; 
µ
λ
s ≡ short-term borrowing by λ in s ∈ S; 
rs
δ ≡ short-term rate offered by bank δ in s ∈ S; 
es1
λ ≡ endowment of goods of λ in s ∈ S; and 
ms
λ ≡ monetary endowment of λ in s ∈ S; 224 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis
2.5 Bank γ’s Optimization Problem
Bank γ (as also bank δ) maximizes its expected profits in the 
second period. In the first period, it borrows from the interbank 
market, since it is relatively poor in initial capital, and extends 
credit in the short-term loan and mortgage markets. It also receives 
deposits from φ. In the second period, it receives the repayment 
on the mortgage it extended (full repayment for s S ∈ 1
α and partial 
repayment otherwise, since the value of the collateral is less than 
the amount of the mortgage), repays its interbank and deposit 
borrowing, and extends short-term credit. Its maximization problem 
is as follows:3
max
, , , , π µ µ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ θ π π
s s I d m m s s s
s S





























(that is, short-term lending + mortgage extension ≤ interbank loans 
+ consumer deposits + initial capital endowment at t = 0);
m m r m r e s S s d I s s
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ µ µ + + ≤ + + + + ∀ ∈ ( ) ( ) 1 1 0 0   (18)
(that is, short-term lending + deposit repayment + interbank loan 
repayment ≤ effective mortgage repayment + first period short-term 
loan repayment + capital endowment in s ∈ S); and
π
γ γ γ
s s s m r s S = + ∀ ∈ ( ) 1   (19)




s ≡ bank γ’s profits at state s ∈ S;
3. Banks’ risk aversion is captured via a quadratic objective function, as in essence 
they are facing a portfolio problem and we want to capture diversification effects as 
closely as possible.225 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
m
γ ≡ mortgage extension by bank γ;
ms
γ ≡ short-term loan extension by bank γ at state s ∈ S*;
µ
γ
I ≡ interbank borrowing by bank γ;
µ
γ
d ≡ amount borrowed from consumers in the form of deposits by 
bank γ;
rs
γ ≡ effective repayment rate on the mortgage at state s ∈ S;
rs
γ ≡ short-term rate offered by bank γ in s ∈ S*;
ρ ≡ interbank rate; and
es
γ ≡ capital endowment of bank γ at state s ∈ S*.
2.6 Bank δ’s Optimization Problem
Bank δ maximizes its expected profits in the second period. In the 
first period, it deposits in the interbank market, since it is relatively 
rich in initial capital, and extends credit in the short-term loan and 
mortgage markets. In the second period, it receives the repayment 
on the mortgage it extended (full repayment for s S ∈ 1
β and partial 
repayment otherwise, since the value of the collateral is less than the 
amount of the mortgage), receives payment from depositing in the 
interbank market, and extends short-term credit. Its maximization 
problem is as follows:
max
, , , π
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ θ π π
s s I m m d s s s
s S










m m d e I 0 0
δ δ δ δ + + ≤   (20)
(that is, short-term lending + mortgage extension + interbank 
deposits ≤ initial capital endowment at t = 0); 
m m r m r d e s S s s I s
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ ρ ≤ + + + + + + ∀ ∈ ( ( ( ) ) ) 1 1 1 0 0   (21)
(that is, short-term lending ≤ effective mortgage repayment + first 
period short-term loan repayment + interbank deposits and interest 
payment + capital endowment in s ∈ S); and
π
δ δ δ
s s s m r s S = + ∀ ∈ ( ) 1   (22)226 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis




s ≡ bank δ’s profits at state s ∈ S;
m
δ ≡ mortgage extension by bank δ;
ms
δ ≡ short-term loan extension by bank δ at state s ∈ S*;
dI
δ ≡ interbank deposits by bank δ;
rs
δ ≡ effective repayment rate on the mortgage at state s ∈ S;
rs
δ ≡ short-term rate offered by bank δ in s ∈ S*; and
es
δ ≡ capital endowment of bank δ at state s ∈ S*.
2.7 Market Clearing Conditions
There are six market categories in our model (namely, goods, 
housing, mortgage, short-term loan, consumer deposit, and interbank 
markets). Each of these markets determines a price that equilibrates 
demand and supply in equilibrium.
2.7.1 The goods market
The goods market clears when the amount of money offered for 


























α β λ .  (24)
2.7.2 The housing market
The housing market clears when the amount of money offered for 
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When agent h ∈ {α, β} defaults on his mortgage, the amount of 
housing he has pledged as collateral will be offered by his bank for 
sale in the market. This amount is equal to the amount of housing 
he purchased in the initial period, that is, b p
h
02 02 / . For example, in 
state s S S S ∈ ∩ 1 1 1
β α β \ , agent α (but not β) defaults, so the amount of 
housing he purchased in the initial period and pledged as collateral 
will be offered for sale by bank γ.









the effective return on the mortgage is min(value of collateral, 
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where k = γ for h = α and k = δ for h = β. We thus get the following 
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2.8 Definition of Equilibrium







h h s s s q b h =( )∈ × × × ∈{ }
+ + +
1 2
1 1 1 , , , , ; R R R R for
σ µ
φ φ φ φ φ =( )∈ × × ×
+ + + q b d s s s
s s s
2 1
1 1 1 , , ; , R R R R
σ µ
λ λ λ λ =( )∈ × × q b s s s
s s s
1 2 , , ; R R R
σ π µ µ
γ γ γ γ γ γ =( )∈ × × ×
+
s s I d
s s m m , , , , ; R R R R
1
σ π
δ δ δ δ δ =( )∈ × × ×
+
s s I
s s m m d , , , . R R R R
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Also, let η ρ
γ δ γ γ δ δ = ( )
∈ × × × × ×
+ + + +
p p r r r r r r s s s s s s
s s s s
1 2
1 1 1 1
, , , , , , , ,
R R R R R R R R R R
s s × × × ;
B h





















































eqs.(17) hold 19  and 
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eqs. hold 20 22
We say that ( , , , ; , , , , , , , , ) σ σ σ σ ρ
α β φ λ γ δ γ γ δ δ p p r r r r r r s s s s s s 1 2  is a monetary 
equilibrium with commercial banks, collateral, and default if




n Argmax n n ∈ ∈{ } ∈ ( ) , , , , Π n
and




k Argmax k k ∈ ∈{ } ∈ ( ) , , Π k
and if all markets in equations (23) through (38) clear.
3. DisCussion of equilibRium
In this section, we investigate a parametrized version of the 
model whereby only three states of nature are possible in the second 
period. We have chosen the exogenous parameters in our model so as 
to illustrate a housing and mortgage crisis. Their initial values are 230 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis
presented in table 1. The initial equilibrium yielded by the model is 
presented in table 2 and analyzed below.
Table 1. Exogenous Variables
Coefficient 
of risk 
aversion Endowment Housing Money Capital Other
cα = 1.3 e0
α
1  = 11 e0
φ
2  = 5.5 m0
α  = 0.1 e0
γ  = 4 MCB = 65 
cβ = 1.3 e1
α
1  = 10 m1
α  = 0.1 e1
γ  = 0.7 Mγ
C
1
B  = 10.9
cφ = 1.3 e2
α
1  = 10 m2
α  = 4.4 e2
γ  = 0.7 Mγ
C
2
B  = 8
cγ = 1.3 e3
α
1  = 0.7 m3
α  = 0.1 e3
γ  = 0.7 Mγ
C
3
B  = 0.5
cγ = 0.005 e0
β
1 = 2 m0
β  = 5.8 e0
δ  = 13 M δ    
C
1
B  = 2.4
cδ = 0.005  e1
β
1 = 7 m1
β  = 0.1 e1
δ  = 1 M δ    
C
2
B  = 0.8
e2
β
1 = 3 m2
β  = 0.1 e2
δ  = 1 M δ    
C
3
B  = 0.5
e3
β
1 = 0.1 m3
β  = 0.1 e3
δ  = 1 θ1 = 0.90
e1
λ
1 = 4 m0
φ  = 0.1 θ2 = 0.075
e2
λ
1 = 4 m1
φ  = 0.1 θ3 = 0.025
e3
λ
1 = 3 m2
φ  = 0.1
m3
φ  = 0.1
m1
λ  = 0.1
m2
λ  = 0.1
m3
λ  = 0.1
es1: Endowment of goods in state s ∈ S*.
e02: Endowment of houses at t = 0.
ms: Private money held by households in state s ∈ S*.
e0: Initial capital of banks.
es: Additional capital of banks in state s ∈ S.




B: Money injection by the central bank in the short-term loan market organized by bank k ∈ {γ, δ} in state s ∈ S.
θs: Probability of state s ∈ S.231 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
In the initial equilibrium, we examine three different scenarios 
that can occur in the second period. State 1 occurs with the highest 
probability, and state 2 is more probable than state 3. State 1 is the 
good period in which neither borrower defaults. In state 2, one of 
the two agents, Mr. β, defaults on his mortgage debt, but the other 
does not. In state 3, both default. Agent α is richer in endowments 
of the good in the first period, whereas agent β is relatively richer 
in state 2 in the second period. Bank γ has less initial capital than 
bank δ, while it has more capital in the second period. The capital 
of both banks in the second period can be interpreted as outside 
banking profits or capital injections obtained in the second period 
and will play a crucial role in the comparative statics we perform. 
We have chosen the parametrization to motivate lending in the 
interbank market and in particular to motivate bank δ to deposit in 
the interbank rate.
The level of default on the mortgages depends on the relative 
(second period) differential between the value of houses that each 
agent bought and the mortgage amount they have to repay. Agent 
α, who is richer in the first period, needs to take a comparatively 
lower loan-to-value mortgage for the amount of housing he wants to 
purchase than agent β, since he can finance the purchase through 
the sale of goods in the first period. As a result, the effective return 
to the lending bank on the mortgages in state 3, when both agents 
default, will be higher for α than β. In combination with the fact 
that α does not default in state 2, this results in a lower interest 
rate on the mortgage for α than for β, since rational expectations 
are assumed throughout.
In our simulation, the prices of the good and the house move in 
opposite directions in the second period. The good is relatively more 
expensive in state 2 than state 1 and in state 3 than state 2, whereas 
the opposite holds for the price of the house. The intuition behind the 
result is quite simple, since the model is driven by adverse supply 
shocks to goods endowments, worse in state 3 than in state 2. Agents 
default on their mortgages when the value of the house is low. This 
happens when the endowments of goods are low (that is, an adverse 
supply shock) since agents will not have enough income to allocate 
to the housing market. This, in turn, implies that the price of the 
good should rise.
In order to buy the house, agents α and β sell goods in the first 
period and also take out a mortgage. This creates income for φ, the 
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goods and deposits the rest in the interperiod deposit market. In 
state 1, when α and β do not default on their mortgages and then 
find themselves with more housing than they want, they sell some 
of the amount they bought in the previous period (house prices are 
high relative to goods prices, and utility maximization leads α and 
β to switch out of housing into goods).4 This is possible because the 
economy is going well, endowments of goods are high, and there is a 
strong demand for housing from agent λ, a first-time buyer who enters 
the economy in the second period. Agent φ also finds it profitable to 
sell some of the housing he is left with at those prices.
In state 2, however, Mr. β defaults on his mortgage in period 2   
and essentially loses his house, but he still wants to purchase some 
housing. Although the housing supply is high as a result of the 
delinquencies, demand from α, β, and λ prevents the price of houses 
from collapsing. This gives incentives to φ to sell some of the housing 
he owns, as in state 1.
One would expect the same scenario to occur in state 3. 
However, since both agents α and β become extremely poor in their 
endowments of goods in that state, their demand for housing drops 
precipitously. As a result, the housing market should collapse and 
agent λ, who is the only one endowed with a sufficient amount of 
the scarce good, should be able to purchase housing at a very low 
price. The reason that this cannot happen is twofold. First, agent 
φ finds it profitable to purchase back some of the houses he sold 
in the first period, so both the demand for housing and the price 
are maintained.5 The second and most important factor lies in the 
liquidity constraints that all agents face. In state 3, banks are short 
of liquidity, so they are only willing to lend money short term at a 
very high interest rate. Although the good is very expensive, agent 
λ can only find credit at an extremely high interest rate, which 
prevents him from enjoying the full benefits of the falling housing 
market. This is not the case for φ as he has money at hand from 
depositing in the first period.
Finally, lower prices is the last period are outweighed by the 
high real interest rates. Thus, short-term interest rates rise through 
the Fisher effect.
4. The agents’ cash-in-advance constraints have been adjusted to include housing 
sales as well as goods sales.
5. Since φ does not sell any houses in state 3, he does not demand a short-term 
loan.235 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
4. CompaRaTive sTaTiCs
This section shows the effects of changes in the exogenous 
variables and parameters of the model. Tables A1 and A2 in the 
appendix describe the directional effects on endogenous variables 
of changing various parameters. Although we have performed a 
number of comparative statics, we discuss in detail only those 
that we reckon are the most interesting. The analysis involves 
the following principles, derived from the model structure, on the 
determination of interest rates, the quantity theory of money, and 
the Fisher effect.6 
To determine the interest rate structure, we start with the 
facts that base money is fiat and the horizon is finite, so in the 
end no household will be left with fiat money. All households 
therefore finance their loan repayments to commercial banks via 
their private cash endowment and the initial capital endowments 
of banks. However, since we allow for default, the total amount 
of interest rate repayments is adjusted by the corresponding 
anticipated default rates. In sum, aggregate ex post interest rate 
payments, adjusted for default to commercial banks, is equal to the 
total amount of outside money (that is, sum of cash monetary and 
initial commercial banks’ endowments). In this way, the overall 
liquidity of the economy and endogenous default codetermine the 
structure of interest rates.
The model possesses a nonmechanical quantity theory of money. 
Velocity will always be less than or equal to one (one if all interest 
rates are positive). However, since the quantities supplied in the 
markets are chosen by agents (unlike the representative agent 
model’s sell-all assumption), the real velocity of money (that is, 
how many real transactions can be undertaken by money per unit 
of time) is endogenous. The upshot of this analysis is that nominal 
changes (that is, changes in monetary policy) affect both prices 
and quantities.
Finally, the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest 
rate plus the expected rate of inflation. 
6. The qualitative structure of the initial equilibrium does not change. For example, 
an increase in the price of goods in state 3 does not mean that this price has become 
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4.1 Decrease in the Money Supply
Let the central bank engage in contractionary monetary policy 
by decreasing the money supply (MCB) in the interbank market in 
the initial period (or equivalently increasing the interbank interest 
rate, ρ). The effects on the endogenous variables are summarized in   
table A1 in the appendix.
Increasing the interbank rate induces bank γ to borrow less 
from the interbank market and therefore to reduce its supply of 
short-term loans and mortgages to Mr. α and Mr. φ, pushing up the 
corresponding lending rates, r0
γ and r
γ. Consequently, Mr. α reduces 
his short-term and mortgage borrowing, while Mr. φ similarly 
reduces his short-term borrowing and subsequent deposits in bank 
γ. Since bank δ increases its deposits in the interbank market, Mr. β 
faces stricter credit conditions in the short-term. He will therefore 
switch toward mortgages, which will induce bank δ to reallocate 
its portfolio and supply slightly more mortgages to him. Finally, 
from the liquidity structure of interest rates, last period short-term 
interest rates decrease, except for bank γ in the second state.
Given a higher interest rate, trade becomes less efficient.7 
Quantities of goods and houses traded in the initial period fall, 
as do prices. We see the quantity theory of money in action in 
our model. The reduction of the money supply, given that the 
velocity of money is at most one, typically leads to lower prices and 
quantities traded. Agent heterogeneity and positive trade volumes 
are necessary for this result to hold. Given the low price of housing 
and the increased mortgage extension by bank δ, Mr. β is led to 
demand more mortgages, which results in a higher mortgage rate 
(r
δ) for him, as well. According to the quantity theory of money, 
since less money chases the same amount of goods, prices will 
also drop in the last period. Recall that agents default on their 
mortgages when the value of their housing is less than that of 
their mortgage. Thus, lower house prices in the second period will 
result in lower effective returns on the mortgages (which can be 
interpreted as higher defaults) and even higher initial mortgage 
rates, given rational expectations. An increase in the interbank 
rate results not only in increased mortgage extension by the rich 
bank, but also in lower effective returns (higher levels of effective 
7. The reason is that agents encounter a higher transaction cost.237 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
default) when the bad states materialize. Although the poor bank 
reduces its mortgage extension, it does not find itself in a better 
situation, since the effective return on its mortgages also falls when 
the very bad state obtains.
The higher mortgage extension and mortgage rates for bank δ 
do not outweigh the lower effective returns stemming from default 
on mortgages in the bad states of the world (that is, states 2 and 3). 
The impact on bank γ is the same. Contractionary monetary policy 
thus results in lower expected profits for the banking sector.
The effect on households differs. For Mr. α, an increase in the 
interbank rate has a negative effect on his welfare, whereas the 
opposite holds for Mr. β and Mr. λ. The welfare of Mr. φ remains 
almost unaffected (figure 2). The decrease in α’s welfare is mainly 
due to the fact that he borrows less since he is affiliated with the 
poor bank. Although the price of housing drops at t = 0, the price 
of goods decreases even more (figure 3). Mr. β is affiliated with the 
rich bank and undertakes a bigger mortgage to take advantage of 
the falling housing prices in the initial period. In conjunction with 
the falling short-term rates in the last period (figure 4), Mr. β’s 
welfare goes up. Mr. λ benefits as well from the lower short-term 
rates and enjoys an increase in his utility.
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Figure 3. Housing and Goods Prices versus Money Supply
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 4. Short-Term Interest Rates by Bank δ versus Money 
Supply
Source: Authors’ calculations.
In sum, according to our financial stability measure, contractionary 
monetary policy results in higher financial instability since lower 
banking profits and higher default lead to welfare loses in the bad 
states of nature.239 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
4.2 Liquidity Assistance to Banks in the Very Bad State 
of the World
Let there be an increase in both banks’ capital in the third state 
of the world, which participants in the economy perfectly anticipate 
(table A1). This increase can be in the form of liquidity assistance 
by the government or new equity capital. An increase in the money 
endowments in the third state of the world will result in a price 
increase in goods and housing at that state, as expected from the 
quantity theory of money. A price increase in housing results in a 
higher effective return for both banks when both Mr. α and Mr. β 
default on their mortgages. Finding themselves with more money 
in the very bad state of the world, the banks will increase their 
extension of mortgages at the initial period. This will drive mortgage 
rates down and the demand for mortgages up. Bank δ will switch 
its portfolio from interbank deposits to mortgages, since the latter 
become less risky. Given the increased activity and higher prices 
overall, when government help is anticipated in (very) bad states of 
the world, interest rates in the short loan market rise in the initial 
period as a result of increased money demand by households.
Although the effective returns on mortgages rises and the overall 
default rate falls in absolute terms, both banks will sustain a drop in 
their expected profitability. The reason is that the rates on mortgages 
to which they switch their portfolios drop (figure 5). In addition, 
Figure 5. Mortgage Rates versus Banks’ Capital in State 3
Mortage rate by bank γ
Mortage rate by bank δ
Banks’ capital in state 3  
Source: Authors’ calculations.240 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis
bank γ has to pay a higher interest rate for the money it borrows 
from depositors and the interbank market, and bank δ does not fully 
take advantage of the higher interbank rate, since it reallocates its 
portfolio toward mortgages that obtain higher effective returns.
The welfare of Mr. φ decreases because the liquidity injection 
occurs in state 3, when he is relatively rich, and he suffers a negative 
wealth effect due to higher prices in that state. Apart from Mr. φ, the 
effect on household welfare is positive (figure 6). Agents α, β, and γ 
are all better off since the first two benefit from the lower mortgage 
rates and all three take advantage of lower short-term rates in the 
last period, which translates into cheaper credit.





Banks’ capital in state 3
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Liquidity assistance, unlike contractionary monetary policy, not 
only reduces aggregate default, but also improves the real sector 
of the economy since it eases credit conditions for households and 
first-time buyers.
4.3 Banks Become Less Risk Averse
Assume that both banks become more risk loving (see table A2 
in the appendix). The change in risk aversion is anticipated in the 
first period. Their first response will be to switch from safer to riskier 
investments. Consequently, the extension of mortgages increases and 
short-term lending decreases, which means lower mortgage rates 241 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
and higher short-term rates in the initial period. Bank δ also reduces 
its interbank deposits, which results in bank γ having less funds for 
extending credit. Mr. α takes advantage of the lower mortgage rates 
and demands more mortgages. He also reduces his sale of goods in 
the initial period, since he can finance his housing purchases with 
more mortgages, and the transaction cost of selling his goods (that 
is, the short-term interest rate) has risen due to the banks’ fund 
reallocation. Mr. β, who is poorly endowed in the initial period, will 
also reduce his sale of goods and his short-term borrowing. He will 
not demand more mortgages, however, as the drop in the mortgage 
rate allows him to maintain his housing purchases. The mortgage 
rate falls more for Mr. β than for Mr. γ because he is affiliated with 
bank δ, which has more funds to allocate to mortgages since it reduces 
its interbank and short-term lending. The demand for housing has 
increased, but its initial price will fall because Mr. α and Mr. β reduce 
their initial supply of goods to the market and Mr. φ has to sell more 
of his housing endowment to fund his purchase of goods. Thus, Mr. 
φ’s disposable income falls, and he allocates less money to the goods 
markets, forcing their initial price to drop as well.
Lower housing prices and higher mortgage extension translate 
into lower effective returns on mortgages because of higher aggregate 
default in the economy in the bad states. Depending on the severity of 
the reduction in risk aversion and its initial level, aggregate default 
may increase a lot. In our exercise, we have chosen a relatively low 
initial risk aversion (to capture the banks’ precrisis risk aversion 
in the initial equilibrium), so an even a relatively small increase in 
the appetite for risk results in a 0.5 percent increase in aggregate 
default. Of course, what matters is the directional effect and not the 
absolute number. Unlike our other comparative statics, a change in 
risk aversion, although exogenous in the model, is in reality a choice 
variable of the banks. The reason that they might adopt a more risk-
loving behavior is that they expect higher profits. This is consistent 
with what our model yields.
Households’ welfare moves in different directions (figure 7). 
Mr. φ is better off because houses are a durable commodity and their 
price should be affected positively by a decrease in the overall risk 
aversion in the economy. As a result, the price of housing decreases 
less than the price of goods in the initial period, which generates 
a slightly positive effect on Mr. φ’s welfare (see figure 8). Mr. β, 
who is poorly endowed in the initial period, is also better off, as he 
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utility. Mr. α, on the other hand, is worse off, since he faces a higher 
interest rate for short-term loans in the initial period, which is his 
main source for funding his housing purchases. Mr. λ also sees his 
welfare decrease because of the rise in short-term interest rates in 
the last period in response to higher aggregate default (figure 9) and 
higher real interest rates.







Figure 8. Housing and Goods Prices at t = 0 versus Banks’ 
Risk Aversion
Banks’ risk aversion
Source: Authors’ calculations.243 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis




4.4 Compound Comparative Static
The comparative statics we examine above do not fully exhibit 
what we might expect to observe in a severe mortgage crisis. We 
therefore performed an exercise of letting more than one adverse 
shock occur at a time, in which we allow for contractionary monetary 
policy and a decrease in banks’ risk aversion simultaneously. The 
results are summarize in table A2.
The reduction in the money supply yields a first-order effect 
that pushes up the interbank rate. Bank δ increases its interbank 
lending and reduces its mortgage extension. The reduction in 
risk aversion will moderate this pressure. The trade-off between 
these two effects will determine whether bank δ will extend more 
mortgages. In our simulation we find that mortgage extension by 
bank δ increases. The reduction is more severe for bank γ, since 
it is more dependent on monetary injections. Mortgage rates rise 
(figure 10), since demand does not decrease much due to the higher 
cost of short-term borrowing. Prices of goods and housing fall in all 
periods and states, as predicted by the quantity theory of money. The 
pressure is greater due to lower risk aversion (as discussed above). 
The result is lower expected returns on mortgages, which translate 
into higher defaults in conjunction with the fact that mortgage rates 
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Figure 10. Mortgage Rates versus Compound Decrease in 
Money Supply and in Banks’ Risk Aversiona
Mortage rate offered by bank γ
Mortage rate offered by bank δ
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. More severe shocks are to the left.
Higher default should mean higher mortgage rates, other things 
being equal, but a higher appetite for risk pushes mortgage rates 
down. Nevertheless, these second-order effects are outweighed 
by the increased default resulting from a lower money supply, 
as analyzed in the relevant section. An interesting result is that 
default increases disproportionally when contractionary monetary 
policy is combined with a higher appetite for risk by banks. When 
these adverse shocks occur at the same time, expected repayment 
on mortgages falls more than the aggregate change when they 
happen independently. In particular, nonlinear effects are not 
trivial, as shown in figure 11.
Expected banking profits go up. On the one hand, the lower 
money supply and increased default put downward pressure on 
expected profits, while on the other, lower risk aversion pushes 
them up. In our exercise, the latter forces prevail, but the effect of 
the former becomes more intense as the money supply continues 
to decrease.
The effect on household welfare varies. Agents that are affiliated 
with the poor bank (that is, Mr. α and Mr. φ) observe a decrease 
in their expected welfare, because the stricter credit environment 
affects poorly capitalized banks more severely. In addition, the 
initial price of goods falls more than that of housing (figure 12), Figure 11. Nonlinear Effects on Mortgage Repayment versus 
Compound Decrease in Money Supply and in Banks’ Risk 
Aversiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. More severe shocks are to the left.
Figure 12. Housing and Goods Prices at t = 0 versus 
Compound Decrease in Money Supply and in Banks’ Risk 
Aversiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. More severe shocks are to the left.246 C.A.E. Goodhart, D.P. Tsomocos, and A.P. Vardoulakis
which negatively affects the purchasing power of Mr. α, who 
mainly finances his housing purchase though the sale of goods in 
the initial period. Mr. β is able to benefit from the falling housing 
prices in the initial period by entering a mortgage contract, since he 
is affiliated with a well capitalized—and more risk-loving—bank, 
and his welfare increases. Housing prices in state 1 fall more than 
goods prices (figure 13) because Mr. φ decreases his deposits in 
the initial period and increases his sales of housing in that state 
to finance the purchase of goods. The lower demand for money by 
Mr. β in the last period (partially reflecting lower prices and higher 
defaults) and the well-capitalized position of bank δ put downward 
pressure on short-term interest rates at the states in which agents 
default. Mr. λ benefits from the looser credit conditions and enjoys 
a higher utility.
Figure 13. Housing and Goods Prices in State 1 versus 
Compound Decrease in Money Supply and in Banks’ Risk 
Aversiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. More severe shocks are to the left.
However, lower banking profits in the two bad states and the 
relatively higher aggregate default (relative to contractionary 
monetary policy only) result in higher welfare losses in these states. 
Hence, contractionary monetary policy coupled with an attempt to 
gamble on resurrecting the banks exacerbates the mortgage crisis 
and increases financial instability.247 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
5. ConClusions
Central bank officials are prone to describe the months since 
August 2007 as being akin to wartime. In econometric exercises 
based on longer-run time-series stretching back, say, to 1900, the war 
years of 1914–18, and 1939–45 are frequently omitted (or dummied 
out) as involving regimes and structures too atypical for normal 
analysis. By analogy, the years 2007–08 may also become excluded 
from standard econometric analysis as too extraordinary to fit with 
our standard models. After all, such standard models abstract from 
counterparty risk, from default, from endogenous risk premiums, 
and even from financial intermediation.
If, however, we want to address and model current events, then 
we need a model that incorporates default as a central feature and 
treats credit risk as endogenous (rather than as an exogenous add-
on). The model explored above is such a model, albeit an initial, 
preliminary attempt. Much more needs to be done.
For example, it is an endowment model, so the economy has 
a given time path of goods, houses, capital, and fiat money. With 
such predetermined endowments, the resulting time path of prices, 
interest rates, and quantities just redistributes goods and assets 
among agents. The welfare implications are never clear-cut since 
some gain and others lose. To explore the welfare implications of 
financial crises, they have to be incorporated into a production 
economy, wherein a credit crunch adversely affects output and 
employment, so that real incomes become generally reduced and not 
just redistributed. This can be done and should not be too difficult.
In general, the results of our simulations are more or less what 
most economists would have imagined. Tight money reduces prices and 
quantities traded. Government support to banks in crises stabilizes the 
economy. When banks become risk-loving, a subsequent crisis becomes 
even more extreme. We are encouraged that our model reproduces 
common-sense outcomes. The direction of effects seems correct.
This raises the question of whether such a model as this can be 
taken beyond numerical solution and simulation to the actual data. 
Could it be used to try to match and calibrate the actual time path of 
the major data series in existing countries and to explore alternative 
policy options in real time? We believe that it can, though it will not 
be straightforward to do so.
Running simulations often provides the analysts with more 
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that this exercise has taught us concerns the limitations of a strict 
rational expectations model. In a rational expectations model, an 
event in some subsequent period, such as a change in risk aversion or 
a change in government policy, may be regarded at the outset as a low 
probability event, but in a fully rational world it cannot by definition 
have been entirely unexpected. One cannot run simulations, in a 
rational expectations world, in which the completely unexpected 
occurs. This makes it rather harder to simulate extraordinary 
time periods such as 2007–08. Thus, for example, the risk-seeking 
behavior of financial intermediaries in 2004–06 gave way to strong 
risk aversion in 2007–08 in a way that was entirely unexpected in 
2004–06. Had it been anticipated, it would have been discounted 
in a rational expectations system. The solution is to assume that 
unexpected changes in behavior were actually previously expected, 
but with an extremely small probability—for example, that there 
would be a generalized fall in U.S. housing prices. When we 
started on this exercise, we had not appreciated this. It also raises 
the philosophical question of whether the subjective probability 
distribution of actual expectations, based on some combination 
of the accidents of human history and the limited stretch of our 
imaginations, can ever approximate the true underlying objective 
probability distribution. If that approximation is partial at best, 
in what sense can expectations be held to be rational? Keynes and 
Shackle would have appreciated that question.
Our purpose, however, is not so much to query the current 
rational expectations methodology as to demonstrate that within 
the format of existing best-practice, it should be possible to model a 
combined collapse of the housing and financial markets.249 Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
aPPendix
Supplemental Tables 
We illustrate the results from the comparative statics exercise 
in two tables. The directional effect of a change in the respective 
exogenous variables is presented. Other comparative statics we 
performed include a decrease in liquidity in the short-term loan 
markets in the last period, a decrease in banks’ initial capital, a 
decrease in banks’ capital in the last period, a change in agents’ 
expectations regarding the occurrence of each state of the world, and 
a production shock in the goods market. The results can be found in 
our working paper (Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis, 2009).
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